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GOOD FAITH UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE-A NEW
LOOK AT AN OLD PROBLEM
RUSSELL A. EISENBERG*
INTRODUCTION
Every contract and duty included under the umbrella of the Uniform
Commercial Code' imposes upon the parties thereto "an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement. ' 2 This obligation of good
faith is without question one of the key sections of the Code.3
Furthermore, this obligation of good faith is one of the few require-
ments that cannot be varied by agreement between the parties, although
"the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the
performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are
not manifestly unreasonable."4
Because the definitions of "good faith" set forth in the Code are
very broad, and because the guidelines are few, much confusion has
resulted in determining what the term means in actual practice and how
it should be applied.
The hypotheses of this article are that: a) the requirement of good
faith under the Code is, in effect, a firm, far-reaching directive to the
*J.D. 1961, Marquette Law School; Partner, Howard, Peterman & Eisenberg,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1 Good faith is a requirement of many non-Code transactions, as well. Bankruptcy
Courts, for example, have broad equity powers, and there are several important
good faith provisions in the Bankruptcy Act. See L. Salter, The Bankruptcy
Court and the Creative Imagination. 75 Com. L. J. 221 (1970), and Cont. Ill.
Nat'l. Bk. v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. 294 U.S. 648 (1935), Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934), and 1 REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY
§22, pages 44, 46.
2 Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter cited as U.C.C.) § 1-203. "Every
contract or duty within this code imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." Through judicial interpretation, the obligation
of good faith extends to the performance and enforcement of code transac-
tions.3 E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Coinmercial Reasonable-
ness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666 (1963),
hereinafter cited as Farnsworth ,"Good Faith.'
4 U.C.C. §1-102 (3). "The effect of provisions of this code may be varied by
agreement except as otherwise provided in this code and except that the obliga-
tions of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this code
may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement deter-
mine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable."
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business community; b) parties to a commercial transaction must
conduct their business in a just and a moral manner, within the frame-
work of generally accepted prevailing business practices and aware of
what is happening; c) they "must beware", just as buyers and sell-
ers in retail transactions "must beware";5 d) the day has passed
when courts will close their eyes to the facts involved and enforce a con-
tract or transaction because it was purportedly entered into between
seemingly knowledgeable and experienced businessmen who considered
themselves to be in an equal bargaining situation when they entered into
the transaction or agreement.
This article will point out the statutory and common law require-
ments of good faith. It will then demonstrate the confusion that has
resulted from the attempts to define and redefine the term "good faith"
so that the definition can have a broad, universal meaning which can
be applied to all fact situations. Several non-Code areas will be men-
tioned where the "good faith" principle has been applied. Some of the
burden of proof and evidentiary problems will be explored. The con-
clusion will then be drawn.
REQUIREMENTS FOR "GOOD FAITH"
The basic statutory "good faith" requirement for all Code transac-
tions is set forth in Sec. 1-203, in the General Provisions Chapter. It
states, "Every contract or duty within this code imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
"Good faith" is then defined in Sec. 1-201 (9) as "Honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned."
The 1962 official text with comments points out that there are additional
requirements. See, e.g. Secs. 2-103 (1) (b), 7-404.6
One of the sections setting forth additional requirements is Sec. 2-
103, pertaining to Sales, which intends to give a somewhat more limited
definition of good faith, defining it as follows:
"Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing in the trade.7
It is evident that the definition of good faith in Sec. 2-103, for all
practical purposes, is as nebulous as the definition in Sec. 1-201 (19).
Nonetheless, the concept of good faith is of paramount importance in
all Code transactions, as many counselors and clients have learned after
underestimating its potency.
5 See Eisenberg, Let the Seller Beware-A New Concept Under the U.C.C., 72
Com. L. J. 349(1967).
6UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COM-
MENTS, The American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws (1963), at 27, hereinafter cited as U.C.C.
1962 OFF. TEXT WITH COMMENTS.
7 U.C.C. §2-103 (1) (b)
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The importance of the good faith doctrine was clearly pointed out
by Professor E. Allan Farnsworth when he illustrated that "there is an
express mention of 'good faith' in some fifty out of the four hundred
sections of the Code."" An example of how the doctrine can be of vital
importance in a specific fact situation can be imagined by reading Sec.
2-311 (1):
An agreement for sale which is otherwise sufficiently definite
(s. 2-204 (3)) to be a contract is not made invalid by the fact
that it leaves particulars of performance to be specified by one of
the parties. Any such specification must be made in good faith
and within limits set by commercial reasonableness.
In addition, there are numerous sections of the Code that do not
expressly mention "good faith", but in which the concept is implied and
is required. An example is Sec. 2-601, Buyer's rights on improper de-
livery:
Subject to Sec. 2-612 on breach in installment contracts and un-
less otherwise agreed under ss. 2-718 and 2-719 on contractual
limitations of remedy (ss. 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods or the
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract,
the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
In reference to this section, the official comment says: "Changes: Partial
acceptance in good faith is recognized. . . ." (emphasis added)
In addition to the statutory requirements of good faith are similar
requirements imposed by the courts. These common law good faith re-
quirements are reiterated with regularity. A good example is the recent
case of Beaugureau v. Beaugureau1 ° in which the Arizona Court of
Appeals declared:
In every agreement there is an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, i.e. an implied obligation by each party to co-
operate with the other so that he may obtain the full benefit of
performance. Such implied terms are as much a part of a contract
as are the expressed terms. (cited cases omitted)
WHAT Is "GooD FAITH"
One would think that because the good faith requirement is pervasive
throughout the Code, a series of definitions and guidelines would be
given. That is not the case, however. No guidelines are given, and the
definitions, as previously pointed out, are broad and nebulous. It is
8 Farnsworth, Good Faith supra note 3 at 667.
9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, U.C.C. Vol. 1, P. 355 (West, 1968).10 11 Ariz. App. 234, 463 P.2d 540 (1970). For an interesting discussion of re-
quirements contracts and the termination thereof, see Squillante, Common
Law Bankruptcy and Requirements Contracts, 75 Com,. L. J. 164 (1970).
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therefore only natural to expect that legal scholars and trial judges
would look for universal guidelines and more specific definitions which
could be applied whenever the "good faith" issue was raised. Need-
less to say, that is what happened.
Judges were faced with the difficult choice of either refining the defi-
nitions in the Code so as to have them apply to as many situations as
possible and to try to develop a set of guidelines, or to decide each case
solely on the basis of the facts at hand, and base each case solely on
principles of equity with regard to other decisions, definitions, and
guidelines. Most judges understandably were reluctant to take the latter
approach since they realized that good faith in the final analysis would
be simply what a judge said it was, and that what would be considered
to be a fair business transaction in one community would be held to be
just the opposite in another locality, even if the same litigants and the
same fact situation were involved, and even if the parties were in agree-
ment as to the moral basis of the transaction."
The result was further confusion.
11 It is not difficult to comprehend the importance of this problem. Suppliers of
merchandise do not want to be put in a position whereby they must defend law-
suits in other communities throughout the country when purchasers claim that
the seller failed to meet the good faith requirement at some point in the trans-
action.
This problem is now being resolved by two methods. First, when there is a
written contract, the seller specifies that the law in his state shall govern the
transaction.
Second, effective "long-arm statutes" are being passed by state legislatures.
A creditor is thus able to bring an action in his native state and county, with
local judges passing upon the various aspects of the transaction.
A good example of such a statute in the new §410..10 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure. According to Gorfinkel and Lavine, in their article
Long-Arm Jurisdiction in California Under New Section 4vO 10 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTINGS L. J. 1163, 1165 (1970), it is "the most com-
prehensive long arm statute of any state." It simply states:
"A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not incon-
sistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."
A thorough analysis of the legal basis for this California statute is found in
the "Comment-Judicial Council", West ANNOTATED CAL. CIVIL PROC.
CODE (Supp. 1970 at 94).
Other states have statutes which are meant to accomplish essentially the
same purpose An example is Wis. STAT. §262.05. It states, in part:
"A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has juris-
diction over a person served in an action pursuant to Sec. 262.06 (either
within or without this State) under any of the following circumstances
(5) Local Services, Goods, or Contracts.
In any action which:
(a) Arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plaintiff or
to some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defend-
ant to perform services within this state or to pay for serv-
ices to be performed in this state by the plaintiff; or ...(b) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or
some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant
to deliver or receive within this state or to ship from this
state goods, documents of title, or other things of value;
or...
(c) Related to goods, documents of title, or other things of value
shipped from this state by the plaintiff to the defendant on




Perhaps the first source to which the judges and attorneys looked
for a workable definition of "good faith" was the law dictionaries. Since
the dictionaries themselves give definitions which quote from cases,
the accepted definition in the dictionary would depend on what source
the editors would accept as authoritative.
One of the most quoted definitions of "good faith" comes from
Bouvier's Law Dictionary.'2 This is the often-quoted definition generally
credited to Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 3 in which the definition
appears. It states:
(Good faith is an) honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms
and technicalities of law, together with an absence of all infor-
mation or benefit of facts which would render the transactions
unconscientious.
The leading definition in Black's Law Dictionary 4 was take from
Siano v. Helvering:
Honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge which ought
to put the holder upon inquiry.'5
The next definition in Black's Law Dictionary is the quote from
Warfield v. Allen.'
A somewhat different approach is taken in Ballentine's Law Dic-
tionary.'7 It gives different definitions for different areas of law.
For example, the definition of "good faith" used for cases involving
the issuance of stock is different than the definition used in cases
involving acceptance of a forged check.
OTHER STANDARD REFERENCE BOOKS
There is no section directly on point in Williston on Contracts.'8
Perhaps for the same reason that Williston has so little, Words and
Phrases9 has numerous entries. Several of the definitions are as follows:
Several years ago it was pointed out in the perceptive article Developments
in the Law, State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. R. 909, 1007-8, 1014, that
such statutes were feasible, and that states were "taking advantage of the
available opportunities" as a result of the United States Supreme Court "re-
defining the constitutional limitations on state jurisdiction."
12 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY, P. 1359 (3rd Ed., West, 1914).
"3 248 Ky. 646, 59 S.W. 2d 534, 538 (1933). Although the decision, of course, ante-
dates the Code, the definition is often used in Code cases.
14 at page 822. West (Rev. 4th Ed., 1968).
Is 13 F. Supp. 776, 780, (D.C.N.J., 1936).
16 Warfield v. Allan, supra note 13.
17 W. S. Anderson, Editor, Lawyers Co-Op & Bancroft-Whitney at 258 (3rd Ed.,
1969).
is WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. & 3rd Ed., 1957, 1970). There are
some sections which discuss "good faith" in specific situations. e.g. the "effect
of vendor's (good faith) upon measure of damages in land sale contract". 11
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1399 (3rd Ed., 1968).
19 18A WORDS AND PHRASES 83-131 (West, 1956).
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Generally speaking, "good faith" means being faithful to one's
duty or obligation.20
Good faith is the opposite of fraud and of bad faith, and its non-
existence must be established by proof.2'
Good faith, in the popular sense, is used to denote the actual
existing state of mind, without regard to what it should be from
given standards of law or reason.2 2
Good faith includes not only personal upright mental attitude and
clear conscience, but also intention to observe legal duties . 3
Corbin on Contracts,2 4 like Williston, has no section right on point.
Several sections do discuss various aspects of the problem, however,
particularly in situations involving contractors. 5 No attempt is made
to define "good faith", or to show when and how it must be used or
applied.
Professor Gilmore, in his outstanding work, Security Interests in
Personal Property,2 6 limits his comments on "good faith" to the fol-
lowing:
(A buyer under Sec. 9-3-7 (2)) "is of course subject to the
general obligation of 'good faith' which the Code imposes on all
transactions (Sec. 1-203)...."
In the Restatement of Contracts,2 7 there is no specific heading under
"good faith", but an example is given in the section on reformation,
in which reformation is permitted when one party knows that the writ-
ing doesn't express the intention of the other party, and also knows
what the intention of the other party is.2
GOOD FAITH AS AN "EXCLUDER"
Professor Robert S. Summers, in an intelligently conceived, well
written and thought provoking article,25 takes the following position:
Good faith, as judges generally use the term in matters contrac-
tual, is best understood as an "excluder"-a phrase with no gen-
eral meaning or meanings of its own. Instead, it functions to rule
out many different forms of bad faith.30
20 Hilker vs. Western Automobile Ins. Co. of Ft. Scott, Kan., 204 Wis. 1, 13, 235
N. W. 413, 414 (1931).
21 McConnel v. Street, 17 Il. (7 Peck) 253, 254 (1855).
22 Seymour v. Cleveland, 9 S.D. 94, 68 N.W. 171, 173 (1896), citing Wright v.
Mattison, 59 U.S. (How.) 50, 56 (1855).
23 Fujikawa v. Sunrise Soda Water Works Co., 158 F.2d 490, 494 (9th Cir., 1946).241 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 150 (West, 1963).
25 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 644-5 (West, 1960).
26G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 717,
(Little Brown & Co., 1965).
27 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, A.L.I. (1932).
28 Id. at § 505, "Reformation Where A Mistake of One Party Is known to the
Other." ". . . (with various exceptions) if one party at the time of the execu-
tion of a written instrument knows not only that the writing does not accurate-
ly express the intention of the other party to the terms to be embodied therein,
but knows what that intention is, the latter can have the writing reformed to
that it will express that intention."
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Continuing in the same article, Professor Summers states:
In a particular context the phrase takes on specific meaning, but
usually this is only by way of contrast with the specific form of
bad faith actually or hypothetically ruled out.3 1
He then says:
(T)he typical judge who uses this phrase is primarily concerned
with ruling out specific conduct, and only secondarily, or not at
all, with formulating the positive content of a standard. Good
faith, then, take on specific and variant meanings by way
of contrast with the specific and variant forms of bad faith
which judges decide to prohibit.... (emphasis added) Likewise,
the judge who sees that good faith functions as an excluder
should not waste effort formulating his own reductionist defini-
tions. Instead, he should characterize with care the particular
forms of bad faith he chooses to rule out; bad faith rather than
good wears the pants in this dichotomy. 2 (emphasis added)
Professor Summers' idea raises several questions. If, as he suggest-
ed, a judge should "characterize the particular forms of bad faith he
chooses to rule out", couldn't he as easily formulate guidelines for
acceptable conduct? Wouldn't both approaches be applicable to some
situations which arise, but the specific characterizations of objectionable
forms of bad faith could be endless.
Furthermore, is "good faith" simply what a judge says it is?
Wouldn't each judge, in such a system, determine what his own personal
standards are and apply them to the case at hand, even if the litigants
themselves have different standards which they both agree upon and
which they agree were taken into consideration when they entered into
the transaction? Wouldn't such a system create a great deal of litigation
2 Robert S. Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968), herein-
after cited as Summers, "Good Faith".
A somewhat similar approach vas taken by M. P. Ellinghaus in his article
In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L. J. 759 (1968-9) in which the con-
cept of "good faith" was called "something Pound would have termed a 'stand-
ard," in contrast to a 'rule,' 'principle' or 'conception' (quoting Pound, The
Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARv. L. Rzv. 641, 645-46 (1923).
Ellinghaus also says that these standards are "closely (though not perhaps
exclusively) tied to the maintenance of 'residual categories'." He continues,
quoting T. Parsons, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 17 (1937):
"If, as is almost always the case, not all of the actually observable facts
of the field, or those which have been observed, fit into the sharply, posi-
tively defined categories, they tend to be given one or more blanket
names which refer to categories negatively defined... Y
The Ellinghaus article then continues:
The maintenance of such residual categories-'reasonable', 'due care',
and 'good faith' are obvious if maximally dissimilar examples-is essen-
tial to the well-being of any system, and serves to counteract its inherent
tendency to become logically closed.
30 Id. at 262.
3" Id. at 200.
32 Id. at 202 to 207.
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because one party to the contract decides to break and realizes that he
has nothing to lose by raising the "good faith" issue, hoping that not-
withstanding what he thought, the judge might see the facts otherwise
and rule for him?
Each judge would then be tempted to formulate his own unique
rules and code of conduct. The Uniform Commercial Code would not be
uniform at all, and chaos in the good faith field would result. The sad
fact is that even now, the decisions on good faith are far from uniform.
It seems unlikely to this writer that the sophisticated scholars and
practicing attorneys, who drafted the Code before "long arm statutes"
were as developed as they are now,33 would permit large manufacturers
in the metropolitan areas to be put at the mercy of rural county judges
across the country, or vice versa, whenever the parties were involved in
disputes over good faith conduct. It is evident that the drafters of the
Code believed that uniform decisions in the good faith area could come
about so that under ordinary circumstances businessmen in one part of
the nation could transact business without fear of their counter-parts a
good distance away.
It is unlikely that the Code -would ever be uniformly interpreted if
each judge would "characterize the particular forms of bath faith he
chooses to rule out," which must be done when good faith is treated as
an "excluder". It was succinctly pointed out in Pace Electronic Supplies,
Inc. v. Triton that "(I)n order, in fact, to have a uniform commercial
code operate it should be substantially uniform in practice."
34
That objective cannot be obtained if each judge set his own standards
and decided his cases according to his own individual views.
HIsToRICAL ANALYSIS
Shortly after the first several states adopted the Code, Professor E.
Allan Farnsworth wrote an excellent article on the concept of "good
faith" and commercial reasonableness under the Code.35 The purpose
of the article as it applied to "good faith" was to give an historical
analysis of the concept, and to explain the term in its present context
in the Code. No attempt was made to resolve the problems which Pro-
fessor Farnsworth saw would, and did, develop.
Professor Farnsworth showed that the term "good faith" has been
used for many years.
Field used it in his Civil Code ;36 Chalmers, in the British Bills of Ex-
change and Sales of Goods Act; Crawford, in the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, and Williston, in the Uniform Sales Act. . . .Under the
3 See Supra note 11.
34 Cir. Ct. Milwaukee County, Wis. (1968), 5 UCC REP. 1102.
35 Farnsworth, "Good Faith", supra note 3 at 667-8.
36 FIELD'S CIVIL CODE Sec. 642 (New York State Comm'rs' Draft of a Civil
Code for the State of New York (1862)).
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Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, employer and union are
bound to 'confer in good faith' ;37 under the Bankruptcy Act a petition
for a Chapter X reorganization must be filed in "good faith" .. "
After analyzing the concept of good faith, Professor Farnsworth
took the position that the term "good faith" is used in the Code in two
fundamentally separate senses.3 9 First, and in the larger group of pro-
visions, the term describes "good faith purchase".
Here "good faith" is used to describe a state of mind. A party
is advantaged only if he acted with innocent ignorance or lack of
suspicion. This meaning of "good faith" is very close to that of
lack of notice ... .4 In addition, the Code also uses "good faith"
-as did prior law-in substantially the same sense in protecting
others than purchasers, and these situations will be included in
this discussion under the generic term "good faith purchase". 41
Professor Farnsworth continues:
In a second and smaller group of Code provisions, "good faith"
is used to describe performance or enforcement rather than pur-
chase. In this sense "good faith" has nothing to do with a state
of mind-with innocence, suspicion or notice. Here the inquiry
goes to decency, fairness or reasonableness in performance or en-
forcement. This sense of the term may be characterized as "good
faith performance" to distinguish it from "good faith purchase"
and is the sense in which "good faith" is used in the general
obligation of good faith. It is also the sense in which that term
is used in a number of more specific sections. 42
(It results) in an implied term of the contract requiring coopera-
tion on the part of one party to the contract so that another party
will not be deprived of his reasonable expectations.43
Professor Farnsworth says, "The inclusion of an obligation of good
faith performance in the Code revives an ancient, although largely for-
gotten, principle."4 4 He traced the concept back to Roman Law. The
3 Sec. 8 d, 61 Stat. 142 (1947) ; 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1958).
38 Sec. 141, 52 STAT. 887 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1958) ; see also § 146, 52 STAT.
887 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 546 (1958).
39 Farnsworth, "Good Faith", supra note 3 at 667, 678.
40 Id. at 668. Prof Farnsworth gives as an illustration the fact that being a holder
in due course of a negotiable instrument requires a purchase in good faith.
U.C.C. § 3-302 (1). Also see U.C.C. § 2-403 (1).
41 Id. at 668. As an illustration, Prof. Farnsworth points out that "whether a
warehouseman or carrier who receives stolen goods and redelivers them to the
thief is protected as against the true owner depends, under the Code, upon
whether he received and delivered them in good faith." U.C.C. § 7-404.
42 Id. at 668. Here, as an example, Prof. Farnsworth refers to parties to a sales
contract leaving price or performance terms open. U.C.C. § 2-505 (2), §
2-311 (1). Also see A. M. Squillante, Common Law, Bankruptcy and Require-
menits Contracts, 75 Coii. L. J. 164 (1970).
43 Id. at 669.
44 Id. That statement notwithstanding, the term "good faith" and the concept
often appeared in often-cited pre-Code cases, e.g. Docter v. Furch, 91 Wis.
464, 476, 65 N.W. 161, 164 (1895). In that case, involving the sale of land, the
court, as usual, chose to frame a new definition of "good faith". It said that




concept, however, regularly appeared in the Bible,45 and in various writ-
ings from Biblical times. It was written, "Let the property of thy
fellowman be as dear to thee as thine own,"46 "What is displeasing to
thee, that do thou not to others," 47 and "Thou shalt love thy fellow-man
as thyself.
'48
What conclusion can be drawn from reviewing all of the definitions,
essays, historical analyses, and various approaches taken by acknowl-
edged experts and scholars? The main conclusion is that "good faith"
means different things to different people at different times. The statutes
are broad, the guidelines are few, and the variations in fact situations
and apparent equities are many. It is no wonder that confusion has
resulted, and that universal definitions although noble in design, have
proven to be less than useful or practical.
What is needed is a new approach to the problems at hand and
some "horizontal", rather than further "vertical" thinking. This au-
thor's suggestion is set forth later in the article under the "Analysis and
Recommendation" heading. It is first necessary to illustrate other aspects
of the problem and to detail further necessary background information.
WHEN GOOD FAITH Is REQUIRED DURING A TRANSACTION
When must parties to a contract exercise good faith? All the time!
Good faith is required at every point, from negotiations 49 through per-
formance.
Professor Robert S. Summers, who did an impressive amount of
research and an outstanding job of succinctly condensing a great volume
of cases, pointed out5" that the good faith concept may be invoked dur-
ing negotiations ;51 where one party negotiates "without serious intent
to contract" ;52 "abuses the privilege to withdraw a proposal or an
45Exodus xx 15. "Thou shalt not steal." According to established authority,
"This Commandment has a wider application than theft and robbery." (J. H.
Hertz, THE PENTATEUCH 299 [Soncino Press, London, 1960]). As M.
Friedlander pointed out in commenting on the same Commandment in THE
JEWISH RELIGION, P. 294 (Kegan Paul, Tranch, Trubner, & Co., Ltd.
London, 1891), "There are transactions which are legal and do not involve
any breach of the law, and which are yet condemned by the principles of moral-
ity as base and disgraceful. Such are all transactions in which a person takes
advantage of the ignorance or embarrassment of his neighbour for the purpose
of increasing his own property."
4C Aboth ii 12.
47 Babylonian Talmud, Shabbath 31 a.
48 Leviticus xix 18.
49 This is true even though § 1-203 imposes the good faith obligation in the
"performance or enforcement" of a contract. The extension of the require-
ment in most instances to contract negotiations was brought about by judicial
interpretation and decision which utilized other legal concepts and doctrines
as well, e.g. promissory estoppel. cf. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26
Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
ro Summers, "Good Faith," supra note 29 at 216.
51 Id. at 216, 220.
52 Id. at 221. As authority Prof. Summers cites Heyer Products Co. v. United
States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
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offer" ;53 or enters a deal "not intending to perform or recklessly disre-
gards the prospective inability to perform" ;54 or in the event of the
"seller's disclosure of known infirmities in goods" ;5 or if one party
takes "advantage of another in driving a bargain."56
The issue of a lack of good faith also arises with regularity when a
contract is, or should be, performed. Prof. Summers neatly categorized
and detailed those breaches as follows: "evasion of the spirit of the
deal" ;57 "lack of diligence and slacking off" ;"' "wilfully rendering only
'substantial' performance" ;-9 "abuse of power to specify a contract
term" ;60 "abuse of a power to determine compliance", that is, a party,
without just cause, refusing to be satisfied ;f1 and "interfering -with or
failing to cooperate in the other party's performance". 6 2
Good faith must be exercised even after the contract has been per-
formed if disputes arise. The parties must raise the disputes and attempt
to resolve their grievances in good faith. It is both good common sense
and the law that one of the parties can't conjure up a dispute,63 or take
advantage of the other person while settling the disagreements. 4 There
are also numerous sections of the Code which require that, even when
53Id. at 223. As authority Prof. Summers cites Hoffman v. Red Owl, supra
note 49.
54 Id. at 227. The cause of action could lie in deceit. Prof. Summers cites as
authority Arentson v. Moreland, 122 Wis. 167, 99 N.W. 790 (1904).
55 Id. at 228. If there is an active concealment of the truth, the cause of action
lies in tort. Prof. Summers cites W. PRossER, TORTS 711 (1964). On the other
hand, if the non-disclosure is passive, the remedy would probably lie under
the warranty provisions of the Code. Prof. Summers cites § 2-314 and § 2-315.
58 Id. at 230. If the contract is unconscionable, Prof. Summers refers the reader
to Scott v. United States, 70 U.S. 443 (1870) and Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), 2 UCC REP. SERV. 955. If the
"other party has no real alternative," he refers to Henningson v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). "(I)f the other party is dis-
inclined to read a printed form," refer to Klar v. H. & M. Parcel Room, Inc.,
270 App. Div. 538, 61 N.Y.S.2d 285, aff'd 296 N.Y. 1044, 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947).
If the "other party has inferior negotiating skill," refer to COLLINS, 1962
ANN. SURvEY OF AM. LAw 451, 459-62 (1963). If the "other party has a lack
of knowledge," refer to Kellogg v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 239
Iowa 196, 211-12, 29 N.W.2d 559, 568 (1947). If the problem arises due to
the "other party's emotional state," refer to Newman & Snell's State Bk. v.
Hunter, 243 Mich. 331, 220 N.W. 665 (1928).
7 Id. at 234. Prof. Summers cites Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Blumberg, 234 Md.
21, 534-35, 200 A.2d 166, 174 (1964). See also 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS Sec. 150,
P. 666, 3A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 644-45 (West, 1963).
58 Id. at 235, citing Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel v. United States, 150 F.2d 642,
644 (2nd Cir. 1945).
59 Id. at 237, citing, as authority, A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS, ch. 36 (1960).601d. at 239, citing, as authority, Simon v. Etgen, 213 N.Y. 589, 107 N.E. 1066
(1915).61 at 240, citing, as authority, O'Hare v. McGee, 116 Pa. Super. 318, 176 A.
525,526 (1935).
•62 Id. at 241, citing as authority, Kehm Corp. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 620 (Ct.
Cl. 1950).
G3Modern Dust Bag Co. v. Commercial Trust Co., 34 Del. Ch. 354, 104 A.2d
378 (1954). See also Sylvan v. United States, supra note 58.64See Kellog v. Iowa State Traveling, supra note 56, and Hackley v. Headley,
45 Mich. 569, 574, 8 N.W. 511, 512 (1881).
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there is a bona fide dispute, the notice of the dispute be given timely to
the other concerned parties, and that measures be taken promptly to
correct the defects and to mitigate damages.6 5
Although this section has referred primarily to sales, good faith is
also required in all other commercial areas as well. For example, good
faith in entering into an agreement to obtain commercial paper is a
requisite to becoming a holder in due course. 6 There is no separate
definition of "good faith" in Article 3 on Commercial Paper, although
several other definitions are given.67 The general definition of "good
faith" in Sec. 1-201 applies to commercial paper.6 " Similar parallels
can be found in other sections of the Code.
RELATED LEGAL PRINCIPLES, DOCTRINES AND CASES
There are many situations in which "good faith" is an issue, but
good faith language is not used as such.69 In other cases, good faith lan-
guage is used, but the subject matter is of the type which is not covered
in the code.
In the recent case of Estate of Chayka'70 the good faith doctrine
was held to apply to a probate matter involving joint, mutual and reci-
procal wills by a husband and wife. In that case the husband died, and
his widow then tried to give away the property which she received
under the joint will. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the inter
vivos transfer of a substantial portion of the property received under
the will was "violative of the agreement of the parties, and as a matter
of law not made in good faith." (emphasis added) The Court made the
following statement which appears regularly in good faith cases:
"(T)he covenant of good faith . . . accompanies every contract."',
Good faith language often appears in promissory estoppel cases.72
On the other hand, there are some cases such as those involving unjust
enrichment matters where the issue of good faith is not raised even
though it might be relevant. 3
65 U.C.C. Secs. 2-508, 2-601, 2-602, 2.603, 2-605, 2-606, 2-607, 2-608, 2-609, 2-610,
2-612, 2-616, 2-702, 2-706. Sec. 2-609 (1) states, in part, "A contract for sale
imposes an obligation on each party that the other's expectation of receiving
eud performance will not be impaired."G6 U.C.C. Sec. 3-302.
67 U.C.C. Sec. 3-102.
6s U.C.C. 1962 OFF. TEXT WITH COMMENTS, supra note 6 at 273.
69 Cf. Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith and Free-
dor of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REv. 401, 408 (1964).
,047 Wis. 2d 102, 106, 176 N.W.2d 561, 564 (1970).
71 Id. at 107. The court cited 17 Amf. JUR. 2d, CONTRACTS § 256, P. 653, which states
"Every contract implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it, and
a duty of cooperation on the part of both parties." The court also cited Wis.
STATS. § 401.203 (U.C.C. § 1-203), which states, Every contract or duty within
this code imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement,"
and Wis. Stats. § 401.201 (19) (U.C.C. § 1-201 (19)), which defines good faith
as "honesty in fact."
,2 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
3 See Goff v. Mass Protective Ass'n., Inc. 46 Wis. 2d 712, 176 N.W.2d 576(1970).
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Good faith can play an important role in secured transaction cases.
In Thompson v. United States,7 4 the Court held that Section 85-1-203
(U.C.C. Sec. 1-203) "permits the consideration of the lack of good
faith ... to alter priorities which otherwise could be determined under
Article 9."
In Star Credit Corp. v. Molina,76 a consumer case involving the
purchase of a refrigerator with subsequent assignment of the contract
to a finance company with the usual provision preventing the buyer
from asserting his defenses against the assignee (U.C.C. Sec. 9-206
(L)), the Court permitted the buyer to rescind for good faith reasons.
The Court held that the assignee of the contract was "not an assignee
of these contracts 'in good faith', and thus is not entitled to the 'cut-off'
provisions of Sec. 9-206."
In another secured transaction case, the good faith doctrine was
used to hold the filing of a financing statement to be ineffective. The
debtor moved from one state to another. The secured party, before refil-
ing in the new state, changed the signed copy of the financing statement
that it had in its possession without obtaining the permission of the
debtor. The court held that the secured creditor "showed a lack of
good faith in attempting to continue the perfection of its lien." The
refiling was held to be ineffective.7 6
Perhaps the most important use of the good faith doctrine came
after World War I. The value of the German mark fell to less than a
billionth of its value at the time of the armistice. The country was faced
with the difficult problem of revaluating all debts to be consistent with
the real purchasing power of the mark, even though the German gov-
ernment ordered that the mark be legal tender. According to Professor
E. Allan Farnsworth, "(I)t was the obligation of good faith that was
used as the principal basis of revaluation of debts."77
Kramer Heating & Mfg. Inc. v. United Bonding Ins. Co.,78 is a re-
cent case which definitely will have far-reaching effects. Although the
term "good faith" was not mentioned as such in the decision, the concept
was clearly responsible for the ruling. This was an action by a sub-
contractor to collect for work and materials against an insurance com-
pany under the terms of a performance bond. The attorneys for the
insurance company attempted to raise an issue at the time of the trial
which had not been raised either in the pleadings or in the pre-trial
motions. The Court refused to permit the issue and the defense to be
raised since it was not raised in the answer as an affirmative defense.
74 408 F.2d 1075, 1084 (8th Cir. 1969), 6 UCC Rep. 20.
75 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1969), 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 70.76 1n Re Parks, 16 Ohio Misc. 135 (U.S.D. Ct. N.D. Ohio 1908), 5 UCC Rep.
1107.
77 Farnsworth, "Good Faith," supra note 3 at 679.
7847 Wis. 2d 191, 177 N.W.2d 119 (1970).
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The trial judge, Elliot N. Walstad, ruled in language which was ap-
proved by the Wis. Supreme Court:
You have to apprise him (the opposing counsel) as to the issue
raised. You haven't raised it as far as this court is concerned.
I don't think you have raised it as far as the plaintff's counsel
(is concerned). The plaintiff was concerned about it, as you
knew. You can't lie back. Pleadings are supposed to apprise
parties of the cause of action and what defense is to be raised.
This isn't a game we are playing.79
The court, in effect, held that good faith among litigants and their attor-
neys requires that the issues involved and all defenses be disclosed at
an appropriate time before the trial so that the opposition can study and
analyze them, and be able to present its own case and defenses fully and
fairly to the Court with time for adequate preparation.
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PROBLE-MS OF EVIDENCE
The burden of proof of the allegations in the Complaint rests upon
the plaintiff.8 0 It is not necessary, however, that the plaintiff allege in
the complaint that good faith was an integral part of the transaction at
each stage. That is an affirmative defense which must be raised by the
defendant, if at all.
It is a well established doctrine that "every contract implied good
faith and fair dealing between the parties to it . . ." That doctrine is
further fortified by decisions such as H. P. Hood & Sons v. Heins,
in which the court in a case involving a performance contract, held:
In all such business undertakings, an obligation of good faith
is implied."
Finally, it has been stated, with authority, that:
One is under no obligation to prove that which is not made an
issue in the case by the pleadings .... Nor, in order to recover,
need a party prove allegations which are immaterial as a matter
of pleading.8 3
If the issue of good faith is raised by the defendant in his respon-
sive pleadings, the burden of proof on that issue falls upon the defend-
ant.
The burden of proof is upon the defendant as to all affirmative
defenses which he sets up in an answer to the plaintiff's claim or
cause of action, upon which issue is joined, whether they relate
to the whole case or only to certain issues in the case.
8 4
79 Id. at 195-7, 177 N.W.2d at 122.
so Strictly speaking, the burden in proving the allegations of the complaint rests
upon the plaintiff because the plaintiff asserts the affirmative of the issue set
forth in the complaint, and because, if no evidence were given, the plaintiff
would be unsuccessful in that situation. 29 Amr. JuR. 2d EVIDENCE §§ 127, 140.
si 17A C J.S. CONTa crS § 318 at P. 187.
82 124 Vt. 331, 205 A.2d 561 (1964).
83 29 AM. JUR. 2d EvmENcE § 127.
84 Id. at § 129.
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The official comments to the 1962 text of the U.C.C. states:
(I)n the Article on Sales, Section 2-103, good faith is expressly
defined as including in the case of a merchant observance of fair
dealing in the trade, so that throughout that Article, whenever a
merchant appears in the case, an inquiry into his observance of
such standards is necessary to determine his good faith. 5
The purpose of the Comment appears to be to make it clear to the court
that it can look into the question of good faith of its own volition should
it choose to do so. It does not imply that a change is being made in the
established rules of evidence and burden of proof by requiring good
faith to be affirmatively pled by the plaintiff nor proved by him if the
defense is not raised by the defendant (or by the court)., 6
If the issue of good faith is raised with respect to performance, the
issue is generally decided by a jury.87 Under certain circumstances,
however, a judge can certainly rule on the issue as a matter of law.88
The issue as to whether a party to a contract breached an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing is ordinarily a question of fact.89
It is often difficult to prove a lack of good faith because of the rules
of evidence. The defendant, in raising the affirmative defense, often
finds it necessary to circumvent the parole evidence rule, which, accord-
ing to Wigmore, states:
Generally, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary, alter or contra-
dict the terms of a writing which is a completely integrated legal-
ly operative instrument.90
Can a litigant allege a lack of good faith, and thereby circumvent
the parol evidence rule and put into record testimony otherwise inad-
missible but probably necessary to establish the defense? Looking at
the same problem from the other end, can a judge refuse to permit testi-
mony to be taken on a good faith question because the rules of evidence
will be violated when there is nothing else in the record to substantiate
the claim? Doesn't such testimony have to be permitted at some point,
85 U.C.C. 1962 TEXT WITH COMMENTS, supra note 6 at 27.
86 An interpretation to the contrary apparently was responsible for the dictum
giving an opposite view in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Industries Corp.,
U.S.D.C. E.D. Pa. (1968), 4 UCC Rep. 977, 996-7. This case involved
the sale of collateral by asecured party under Article 9 of the Code. One of
the issues involved the reasonableness of the sale of the collateral after de-
fault. The defendant, amongst other things, in effect questioned the good
faith of the plaintiff. The court held that the "good faith" requirements of
the Code carefully temper the "commerciably reasonable" test. The Court
also said, "The plaintiffs must have shown 'honesty in fact' in the conduct
or transaction concerned, Sec. 1-201 (19), as well as fulfill the pragmatic
tests of commercial reasonableness .... The record in this case makes quite
clear that plaitiffs have carried their burden of showing their good faith."
87 17A C.J.S., CONTRACTS § 630 (b) at P. 1270.
88 See Estate of Chayka, 47 Wis. 2d 102, 176 N.W2d 561 (1970. This case is men-
tioned in the section on "Related Legal Principles, Doctrines and Cases."
8s Pernet v. Peabody Engineering Corp., 248 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1964).
909 WIGMoRE EVIDENCE § 2425 (3rd ed., 1940).
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since the judge often must be familiar with the conduct of the parties
and the facts of what went on before the parties entered into the agree-
ment in order to make a proper ruling on the good faith issue.
Unfortunately as of this time there are no appellate decisions on
these points of law. It is only a matter of time before the issues are
raised in an appeal and the case law develops. In the meantime there
certainly is no reason why under ordinary circumstances the trial judge
should not permit a fairly wide latitude in questioning, and reserve a
ruling on the admissibility of the testimony until the testimony has de-
veloped to a point where an intelligent ruling can be made. Such a pro-
cedure is safe and usually causes few practical problems. If the
judge desires, he can always excuse the jury while the preliminary testi-
mony is taken, and thus avoid problems of instructing the jury as to
excluded testimony.
Another question is how a judge is to determine whether or not a
party acted in good faith when subjective tests are used. Blatant offenses
are no problem, but cases involving major violations constitute the
minority of lawsuits in which the issue is raised.
Various suggestions have been made as to what standards should
apply. Invariably the emphasis is on objective standards, although ob-
jective standards are extremely difficult to formulate. In the final analy-
sis, even the objective standards and objective tests have important
subjective elements and underlying standards. Prof. Farnsworth took
the following position:
Good faith performance properly requires some objective stand-
ard tied to commercial reasonableness. As to good faith purchase,
the case can be made for either the subjective test of Lawson v.
Weston9 ' ("the pure heart and the empty head"), or the objec-
tive test of Gill v. Cubitt92 (must exercise the prudence and cau-
tion of a reasonable man). The inquiry goes to a state of mind.
There is, at least on the face of it, nothing inherently implausi-
ble in a subjective standard looking to actual ignorance or lack of
suspicion, and nothing inherently implausible in an objective
standard looking to the ignorance or lack of suspicion to be
expected of a reasonable man under the same circumstances.
Authority happens to favor the subjective test in order to promote
the circulation of goods and commercial paper.93 (emphasis
added)
914 Esp. 56, 170 Eng. Rep. 640 (K.B., 1801). In that case Lord Kenyon intro-
duced the following subjective test of good faith: "the pure heart and the
empty head."
92 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B., 1824). In that case also involving
commercial paper, the objective test, according to Prof. Farnsworth, replaced
the substantive test. To meet the requirements of the objective test, a person
was required to exercise the prudnce and caution of a rasonable man. (Query:
what's a reasonable man? Is that test truly objective?)
93 Farnsworth, "Good Faith," supra note 3 at 671.
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Judges, in inquiring into the state of mind of the litigants, are then
being asked to do exactly what highly skilled psychiatrists are reluctant
to do.94 The judges are handicapped even further by the rules of evi-
dence, which are definitely not geared to having a judge make a psy-
chiatric judgment of the litigants in a relatively short period of time.
The nature of the trial itself is another factor which makes it very diffi-
cult for a judge to "inquire into the state of mind" of the litigants, as
suggested. 95
ANALYSIS AND RECO MENDATION
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the term "good faith"
and the concept which it represents. The term and the concept are
ubiquitous throughout the Code and are requirements of all commercial
transactions.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there now exists at least as much
confusion about the term and the concept and their application as at any
time in the past. Attempts to refine the definitions given in the Code
and to establish universal standards and guidelines have only added
to the problems. It is unlikely that any such refined definitions or
universal standards will evolve since the term and the concept take
on meaning from the situations in which they are applied. As the factual
situations vary, so will the application of the concept and the nuances
of the term and the concept.
Although it is probably an impossible task to frame universal defi-
nitions and standards of good faith, it is not at all a difficult task to
keep in mind at all times what the concept is meant to accomplish, and
what it requires of businessmen on a daily basis. It is a concept which
has proven viable for thousands of years,98 and a concept which serves
as one of the bases of our civilized society.
It is the concept of the term which must always be stressed and ap-
plied, not standardized definitions, refined definitions, analyses of defi-
nitions and of terms. Courts and businessmen can deal with, and
handle, concepts and understand them and work with them, without
getting "hung up" on definitions, classifications, and rules with excep-
tions which only result in confusion.
The purpose of the term "good faith", and the reason why it per-
vades the Code, is to constantly remind the business community that it
must act in a just and righteous manner, and that it must transact its
business in a moral manner, within the framework of generally accepted
94 See L. J. Friedman, M. D., No Psychiatry in Criminal Court, 56 A.B.A.J. 242(1970).
95 See Jerome Frank, On Lawsuits as Inquiries Into the Truth, from CouRrs
ON TRIAL in E. London, editor, THE LAW As LrrERATuRE, Simon & Schuster(New York, 1966).
98 See "Historical Analysis," supra.
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prevailing business practices, and that it must be aware of what is going
on. If a businessman does not act in that manner, the courts are avail-
able to impose its judgment upon the litigants and to enforce or to
refuse to enforce the commercial agreements as is just and equitable
under the circumstances presented to the courts.
The concept, when applied on a day to day basis, is therefore a
warning to the business community that in all of its dealings with
others, it "must beware", just as buyers and sellers "must beware" in
retail transactions.
The analyses of the term "good faith" should be within the context
of what the concept is trying to accomplish, rather than setting forth
numerous definitions and universal standards that are limited in prac-
tice. The business community should not be required to study defi-
nitions and analyses of definitions to come to a conclusion as to whether
it is acting within the framework of the good faith provisions of the
Code. That is what has caused the confusion, and that is what is not
necessary and can be eliminated.
If businessmen cannot understand the concept and what it is attempt-
ing to accomplish, their education will have to come in non-legal, as
well as legal areas. If a businessman is not certain what standards will
apply to a transaction which he is entering into, he should make inquiry
of the other parties, and he should make a full disclosure of his stand-
ards and intentions.
That is the least that can be expected of businessmen in a civilized
society. That is also the only effective way that the term and the concept
can be given their full meaning and application. That is the only path
which can be taken to keep the concept both viable and practical.
CONCLUSION
The time has come when courts will no longer automatically enforce
contracts and approve the business dealings of purportedly knowledge-
able and sophisticated businessmen who considered themselves to be in
equal bargaining positions when they entered into their business agree-
ments. For a contract to be enforceable or a transaction to be approved
by a court, the parties must have acted in good faith.
The Code is not promulgating a new concept. It is making it as clear
as can be that this concept of good faith is a vital part of the moral
structure of our society, and is a requirement of all business transac-
tions. It cannot be ignored by either the business community or by the
Bar and Bench. Good faith must be an integral part of all business
transactions, and the term and the concept must be applied in a manner
to give the term justice, to make it viable, and to permit the concept
to be used on a day-to-day practical level.
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